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How Uniform Will
the Uniform Trust Code Be:




Unlike researching recent and rapidly developing areas of the law, such as
securities regulations or Internet property issues, researching the law of trusts in
Missouri can entail reading ancient cases from dusty, deteriorating, leather-
bound case books that were rendered more than one-hundred years ago.' Trust
law in Missouri has been developing for more than 180 years. In that process of
development, approximately ninety-four statutes having some relationship to
trusts and trustees have been codified in Chapter 456 of the Missouri Revised
Statutes.2 Other statutes located in odd comers of the Missouri Revised Statutes
are relevant to trust issues to greater and lesser degrees.' While the term "Trust
Code" is too dignified and structured a term to apply to the amalgamation of
statutes in Chapter 456, that chapter covers a significant number of important
topics. Those statutes and innumerable cases constitute a developed and, in
some instances, unique body of law that is relied upon by practitioners both
within and outside of the State of Missouri.
There is no doubt that the promulgation of the Uniform Trust Code
("UTC")4by the National Conference ofCommissioners on Uniform State Laws
presents a real opportunity to replace the current hit-or-miss Missouri statutory
scheme with a comprehensive, flexible body of trust statutes that is not overly
exhaustive. The UTC could fill some important gaps in Missouri law and solve
issues left open by current statutory provisions. Adoption of the UTC also
* Vice President and Senior Trust Officer, U.S. Bank Private Client Group. B.S.,
University of Tulsa 1978; M.A., University of Tulsa 1981; J.D., Saint Louis University
1984.
1. E.g., Jamison v. Miss. Valley Trust Co., 207 S.W. 788 (Mo. 1918) (holding that
a settlor cannot protect assets from creditors by utilizing a spendthrift clause); Mcllvaine
v. Smith, 42 Mo. 45 (1867) (same).
2. Mo. REv. STAT. ch. 456 (2000).
3. E.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 472.300 (2000) (governing representation rules on trust
litigation matters); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 362.550.10-.11 (2000) (respectively covering trust
company mergers and the power oftrust companies to purchase proprietary mutual funds
in trust accounts).
4. UNIF. TRUST CODE (2000) [hereinafter UTC].
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would give Missouri access to authority that develops in the other jurisdictions.
Missouri has recently adopted variations of two Uniform Acts in the trust and
estate area, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act in 1996' and the 1997 Revised
Uniform Principal and Income Act in 2001.
On the other hand, trust law changes slowly and any body of law should be
substantially changed only after full and careful consideration. After extensive
analysis, it is clear that Missouri has adopted some unique statutes and
combinations of statutes that express policy decisions that are much different
than those made in corresponding provisions of the UTC. One such example is
Section 456.590.2,' which provides that a court may vary the terms of a private
trust in very specific manners, including terminating the trust earlier than
specified, upon consent of all adult beneficiaries without regard to whether a
5. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 456.900-.913 (2000).
6. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 469.401-.467 (Supp. 2001).
7. Mo. REV. STAT. § 456.590.2 (2000). The full text of Section 456.590 reads as
follows:
456.590. Power of court to permit deviations or vary terms.--
1. Where, in the management or administration of any property vested
in trustees, any sale, lease, mortgage, surrender, release, or other
disposition, or any purchase, investment, acquisition, expenditure, or
other transaction is in the opinion of the court expedient, but the same
cannot be effected by reason of the absence of any power for that
purpose vested in the trustees by the trust instrument, if any, or by law,
the court may by order confer upon the trustees, either generally or in
any particular instance, the necessary power for the purpose, on such
terms, and subject to such provisions and conditions, if any, as the court
may think fit and may direct in what manner any money authorized to
be expended, and the costs of any transaction, are to be paid or bome as
between capital and income.
2. When all of the adult beneficiaries who are not disabled consent, the
court may, upon finding that such variation will benefit the disabled,
minor, unborn and unascertained beneficiaries, vary the terms of a
private trust so as to reduce or eliminate the interests of some
beneficiaries and increase those of others, to change the times or
amounts of payments and distributions to beneficiaries, or to provided
for termination of the trust at a time earlier or later than that specified by
the terms.
3. The court may, from time to time, rescind or vary any order made
under this section, or may make any new or further order.
4. An application to the court under this section may be made by the
trustees, or by any of them, or by any person beneficially interested
under the trust.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 456.590 (2000).
[Vol. 67
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material purpose of the trust remains to be accomplished.' This statute is
different from the rule of all other common law jurisdictions in the United States9
and the rule set forth in the UTC.' In addition, the rights of a settlor's creditors
to reach trust assets, both during the settlor's life and after the settlor's death, are
dealt with in a comprehensive manner that is not inconsistent with the UTC." It
is very likely that, even if Missouri adopts a version of the UTC, it will lack
uniformity at least in these two areas.
I1. MISSOURI'S PECULIARITIES
In 1983, Missouri adopted a unique approach to trust modification.'
Rejecting the rule of Claflin v.,Claflin,'13 then in force in Missouri 4 and in most
otherjurisdictions in the United States,'" Missouri adopted a statute'6 based upon
the English Variation of Trusts Act (1958).7 The English and American
approaches to whether the settlor or beneficiary should control the trust
8. Mo. REv. STAT. § 456.590.2 (2000).
9. Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Missouri's Repeal of the Claflin Doctrine-New View of
the Policy Against Perpetuities, 50 Mo. L. REv. 805, 807 (1985).
10. UTC § 411 cmt.
11. See infra notes 90-103 and accompanying text. Compare Mo. REV. STAT. §
456.080.3 (2000), with UTC § 505(a)(2).
12. Mo. REv. STAT. § 456.590.2 (2000). It appears that few other states, if any,
have rejected the Claflin doctrine so completely. However, the same effect has been
achieved under non-judicial trust reformation statutes, such as WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 11.96A (West Supp. 2002) in Washington State.
13. 20 N.E. 454 (Mass. 1889). There has been some speculation that Missouri
courts still may be required to examine whether there is a material purpose left to be
served by a trust where termination or modification has been consented to and the other
provisions of Section 456.590.2 have been met. See Wiedenbeck, supra note 9, at 813;
Robert J. Swift, Jr., Modification, Revocation, and Termination of Trusts, in 1 MISSOURI
TRUSTS, POWERS OF ATTORNEY, CUSTODIANSHIPS, AND NONPROBATE MATTERS, TRUST
AND ESTATE SERIES § 5.5 (MoBarCLE 1998). However, the only case to apply Section
456.590.2, Hamerstrom v. Commerce Bank of Kansas City, X.A., 808 S.W.2d 434,438
(Mo. Ct. App. 1991), did not undertake any analysis of the material purpose of the trust
and ordered modification on finding that the statutory requirements had been met. It is
hard to escape a conclusion that a material purpose analysis is not required in a Section
456.590.2 action. Wiedenbeck, supra note 9, at 817.
14. Bennet v. Tower Grove Bank & Trust Co., 434 S.W.2d 560, 562-64 (Mo.
1968); Thomson v. Union Nat'l Bankin Kan. City, 291 S.W.2d 178,182-84 (Mo. 1956).
15. Wiedenbeck, supra note 9, at 807.
16. Mo. REV. STAT. § 456.590.2 (2000).
17. Variation of Trusts Act, 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 53 (Eng.).
2002]
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traditionally have been at odds. 8 A comprehensive analysis of the legal
background of Section 456.590.2, however, is beyond the scope of this Article. 9
Section 456.590.2 has been widely used in a variety of situations since its
enactment. Trust distributions have been increased because of unforeseen
changes in economic conditions and the beneficiary's personal circumstances.20
Trusts have been terminated because of the administrative cost and the low yield
earned on trust assets and because of the desires of all of the adult beneficiaries
to benefit the life beneficiary." Trusts also have been terminated because of
their small size and the apparent failure of the line of a settlor's descendants.'
Trust terminations and reformations also have been used to accomplish estate,
gift, and generation skipping transfer tax planning, to effectuate settlements in
trust and estate litigation, to change trustees, to change beneficiaries, and to alter
almost every conceivable provision in irrevocable private trusts.'
The use made of this statute may be far beyond that anticipated by its
drafters, who stated:
Since 1958 England has had legislation empowering the court to alter
the distributive provisions of a trust when it finds that the change
would benefit the beneficiaries and all sane adult beneficiaries concur.
This is useful chiefly to meet changes in tax laws. A minor change in
the distributive provision of a trust (e.g. eliminating the settlor as a
possible contingent beneficiary) may effect tax savings which will
benefit all of the beneficiaries.'
18. 4 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS § 337 (4th ed. 1989).
19. For an excellent analysis of the background of Section 456.590.2 and an
analysis of the statute's ambiguities, see Wiedenbeck, supra note 9. For a good
comparison of Section 456.590.2 and trust modification provisions of the UTC, see Julia
Walker, Note, Get Your Dead Hands OffMe: Termination and Modification Under the
Uniform Trust Code, 67 Mo. L. REV. 443 (2002).
20. See Hamerstrom v. Commerce Bank of Kan. City, N.A., 808 S.W.2d 434,436-
38 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
21. This was the stated reason for the termination sought in In re Trust ofNitsche,
46 S.W.3d 682, 686 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001), and, while not successful in that case, there is
reason to believe that many trusts have been terminated for similar reasons.
22. Heywood H. Davis & Dan C. Sturdevant, Litigation Settlements in Probate
Matters, in 2 MISSOURI ESTATE ADMINISTRATION, TRUST AND ESTATE SERIES § 25.12
(MoBarCLE Supp. 2001).
23. See id.; Swift, supra note 13, § 5.5.
24. MISSOURI BAR PROBATE & TRUST COMMITTEE, MISSOURI PROBATE UPDATE
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The drafters of the statute apparently believed that the requirement that a
termination or modification be shown to "benefit the disabled, minor, unborn
and unascertained beneficiaries"' would be a real limitation on the power to
alter or terminate irrevocable trusts. This has not been the case. InHamerstrom
v. Commerce Bank ofKansas City, N.A., 26 the Missouri Court of Appeals for the
Western District of Missouri went to great lengths to find that the term
"beneficiary," as used in the statute, did not include persons who might take trust
assets by operation of law. Under this analysis, only a beneficiary or classes of
beneficiaries who are specifically identified in a trust document acquire the
protection of the statute. Thus, an heir of the settlor is a beneficiary for purposes
of Section 456.590.2 if the trust document contains an ultimate distribution
provision providing for trust assets to pass to the "heirs" of the settlor, but the
heir is not protected if he or she is not referred to by class, yet has the same right
under a common law reverter or reversion.27
While the courts in the two reported cases dealing with the statute28 both
appointed a guardian ad litem ("GAL") to represent the disabled, minor, unborn,
and unascertained beneficiaries of the trusts in question, the statute does not
require the appointment of a GAL.29 The statute suggests that the court act as the
GAL and make a determination of benefit to the unrepresented classes in a
Section 456.590.2 action. 3 In practice, it is probably the exception-rather than
the rule-that a GAL is appointed.
Terms of a trust that prevent the interest of a beneficiary from being either
voluntarily or involuntarily transferred are valid in Missouri.3' Prior to 1986,
spendthrift clauses that protected assets from the settlor's creditors were invalid
in Missouri.32 In 1986, Section 456.080.3 was completely changed. After
enactment of a clarifying amendment in 1989, the Section now provides that a
spendthrift provision protects a settlor's retained interest in an irrevocable trust
25. Mo. REv. STAT. § 456.590.2 (2000).
26. 808 S.W.2d 434 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
27. Id. at 438.
28. Id.; In re Trust of Nitsche, 46 S.W.3d 682,683-86 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001).
29. Mo. REV. STAT. § 456.590.2 (2000); see also Swift, supra note 13, § 5.9;
Walker, supra note 19, at 453 n.65.
30. Walker, supra note 19, at 453.
31. Mo. REV. STAT. § 456.080.2 (2000).
32. Mo. REV. STAT. § 428.010 (repealed 1986); Mo. REv. STAT. § 456.080.3
(repealed 1986); Jamison v. Miss. Valley Trust Co., 207 S.W. 788, 789-90 (Mo. 1918);
Mcllvaine v. Smith, 42 Mo. 45, 58 (1867). Before it was amended in 1986, Section
456.080.3 stated: "If the settlor is also a beneficiary of the trust, a provision restraining
the voluntary or involuntary transfer of his beneficial interest will not prevent his
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to the extent that the settlor is one of a class of beneficiaries entitled to trust
income or a principal in the trustee's discretion.33 This exception is unusual
among United States jurisdictions.34
Section 456.080.3 was not enacted to create an onshore/offshore
jurisdiction for settlors to protect assets from creditors. Rather, the purpose of
the 1986 amendment was to allow the settlor of an irrevocable trust to retain an
interest in an irrevocable trust that would not result in the inclusion of the assets
of that trust in the settlor's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes on the
settlor's death.35 It has been held that a discretionary interest retained by a
33. Section 456.080.3 states:
A provision restraining the voluntary or involuntary transfer of beneficial
interests in a trust will prevent the settlor's creditors from satisfying claims
from the trust assets except:
(1) Where the conveyance of assets to the trust was intended to hinder,
delay, or defraud creditors or purchasers, pursuant to section 428.020,
RSMo; or
(2) To the extent of the settlor's beneficial interest in the trust
assets, if at the time the trust was established or amended:
(a) The settlor was the sole beneficiary of either the income
or principal of the trust or retained the power to revoke or
amend the trust; or
(b) The settlor was one of a class of beneficiaries and
retained a right to receive a specific portion of the income or
principal of the trust that was determinable solely from the
provisions of the trust instrument.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 456.080.3 (2000). Some courts have failed to recognize this change
in the law. In re Markmueller 51 F.3d 775, 776 (8th Cir. 1995); In re Enfield, 133 B.R.
515, 519 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1991).
34. Alaska, Colorado, Delaware, Nevada, and Rhode Island now allow settlors to
protect assets from creditors to some degree. See ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110 (Michie
1997); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-10-111 (2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3570 (2001);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 166.110 (Michie 1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18-9.2-1 to 18-9.2-7
(2000); In re Baum, 22 F.3d 1014, 1016 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that the Colorado
statute only applies to creditors who exist at the time assets are transferred to a
spendthrift trust for the benefit of the settlor).
35. Missouri Bar Probate and Trust Committee, Proposed Amendment to Section
456.080 (Spendthrift Trusts) and Amendments to Principal and Income Act, § 456.080.3
cmt. (Sept. 19, 1985) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Missouri Bar Probate and
Trust Committee). The full comment reads as follows:
Comments: The 1983 amendments to §456.080.3 create substantial
doubt about the usefulness of certain estate planning devices now in common
use. I.R.C. §§ 2036 and 2038 include in a decedent's estate trusts in which
the decedent has transferred property and retained an interest. However, if a
settlor can only receive distributions of income or principal pursuant to the
absolute discretion of a trustee (other than the settlor) he has not retained such
[Vol. 67
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an interest and the trust assets are not included in his estate. Estate of Giza
Wells, 42 T.C.M. 1305 (1981). Even the expectancy of receiving income in
the absolute discretion ofa trustee can result in the inclusion ofthe trust assets
in the settlor's estate if the state law under which the trust was established
allows the settlor's creditors to reach the trust assets. MaryM andEdsonS.
Outwin, 76 T.C. 153, 168, n.5 (1981). The rationale for this result is that
since the settlor can borrow money and subject the trust assets to his
creditor's claims the settlor has retained control of the trust.
Several estate planning devices operate by the settlor transferring assets
into an irrevocable spendthrift trust with his spouse appointed as trustee. The
spouse/trustee is then given a general power of appointment, the potential
beneficiaries of which include the settlor, or the spouse/trustee is given the
power to make discretionary disbursements ofprincipal or income to a class
of beneficiaries of which the settlor is included. The 1983 amendments to
§456.080 could well result in the settlor's creditors being able to levy on such
trust assets with the result that the trust assets would be included in the
settlor's estate for tax purposes pursuant to I.R.C. § § 2036 and 2038 under the
theory of the Outwin case.
Prior to the 1983 amendment of subsection 3 of §456.080, the validity
of spendthrift trusts in which a settlor was also abeneficiary was governed by
§428.010. See page 1 for the text. Pursuant to the statute, two Missouri cases
allowed the creditors of the settlor to reach assets of trusts under which the
settlor was the sole income beneficiary, Mellvaine v. Smith, 42 Mo. 45
(1867), and Jamison v. Mississippi Valley Trust Company, 207 S.W. 788
(Mo. 1918).
However, the issue of whether the creditors of the settlor can reach trust
assets when the settlor has retained a right to receive income or principal as
one of a class of potential beneficiaries at the discretion of the trustee has
never been addressed by Missouri courts. Cases cited by the legislative
committee on the 1983 amendments to §456.080, Lampert v. Haydel, 96 Mo.
439 (1888), and Bixby v. St. Louis Union Trust Company, 323 Mo. 1014,22
S.W.2d 813 (1929), sustained the validity of spendthrift trusts in Missouri but
did not address the issue of the validity in the context of a settlor's retention
of rights in the trust assets. New York courts have consistently upheld the
validity of spendthrift trusts in which the settlor is a permissible beneficiary
within the discretion of a trustee and, consequently, such assets held in trusts
created in New York are not includable in the settlor's estate for tax purposes.
Herzog v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 116 F.2d 591, 596 (2d Cir.
1941).
Therefore, by allowing creditors to reach assets of trusts in which the
"settlor is also a beneficiary. . .", §456.080.3 (emphasis added), the issue
discussed above seems to be resolved. It would appear that according to this
statute even if the settlor is one of a class of potential beneficiaries and his
right to receive trust income or principal is within the sole discretion of the
trustee, he is still "a beneficiary" ofthe trust. Consequentially, the trust assets
are vulnerable to creditors and the trust assets would be included in the
2002]
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settlor to receive income or principal in the discretion of an independent trustee
is not an interest includable in a settlor's estate under Section 2036 or Section
2038 of the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC") (2001).36 However, inclusion of
such an interest in a settlor's estate for purposes of the federal estate tax still may
occur if the retention of such power would allow the creditors of the settlor to
reach the interest to satisfy claims.37
At the time of the amendment to Section 456.080.3, the main concern was
the inclusion of an interest for federal estate tax purposes retained by a settlor
that took effect after the death of that settlor's spouse who was the life
beneficiary of an inter vivos qualified terminable interest property trust ("QTIP
trust"). 38 For estate planning purposes, a settlor would want to create a QTIP
trust for the settlor's spouse for the spouse's life. However, if the spouse
predeceased the settlor, the settlor would not want the trust assets to pass to
others but, rather, would want the trust to continue for the settlor's benefit. It is
now clear that any interest retained by a settlor following the death of his or her
spouse in an inter vivos QTIP trust is not includable in the settlor's estate for
settlor's estate for tax purposes.
To eliminate the potential for destruction of the useful and common
estate planning devices mentioned above, it is proposed that §456.080.3 be
amended to exclude from the reach of creditors a settlor's interest in a trust
under which the settlor is one of a class ofpotential beneficiaries and his right
to disbursements from the trust are within the complete discretion of the
trustee. The proposed amendment also gives adequate protection to potential
creditors of the settlor. Most settlor created trusts are vulnerable to the
settlor's creditors under subdivisions (1) and (2) of Subsection 3 of the
proposed amendment. Additionally, any settlor created trust that falls outside
the reach of creditors under paragraphs (1) and (2) can be reached if the trust
was established with the intent to defraud the settlor's creditors under
paragraph (3).
Additionally, it should be noted that prudent lenders can easily make
themselves aware that the assets of the settlor are contained in a trust that is
invulnerable to creditors under the proposed amendment to §456.080.3 by
simply requesting a copy ofthe trust. Moreover, persons who make use ofthe
estate planning devices allowed under the proposed amendment would rarely
be in a position where their creditors would have to levy on assets held in
trust.
Missouri Bar Probate and Trust Committee, Proposed Amendment to Section 456.080
(Spendthrift Trusts) and Amendments to Principal and Income Act § 456.080.3 cmt.
(Sept. 19, 1985) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Missouri Bar Probate and Trust
Committee).
36. Estate of Wells v. C.I.R., 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1305 (T.C. 1981).
37. Mary M. & Edson S. Outwin, 76 T.C. 153, 168 n.5 (1981).
38. I.R.C. § 2523(b) (2000).
[Vol. 67
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federal estate tax purposes.39 This is because IRC Section 2044(c) (2001) treats
the full value of the trust assets includable in the deceased spouse's gross estate
under IRC Section 2044(a) as a QTIP trust as being owned by that spouse for
transfer tax purposes." This effectively cuts off any retained interest a settlor
may have in such a trust.
This does not mean that the amendment to Section 456.080.3 was rendered
meaningless by the resolution of the issue of inclusion of a settlor's retained
interest in a QTIP trust. Estate planning techniques that include the settlor's
retention of an interest in a trust that is not included in his or her gross estate
under Section 2036 or Section 2038 arise in a number of contexts. Recently,
there has been discussion regarding the retention of an interest by a settlor in the
event that the federal estate tax is repealed.41 The technique discussed is whether
a settlor can retain an interest in a trust that arises only in the event that the
federal estate tax provisions do not apply. The issue here is whether the
retention of a beneficial interest that arises only on the occurrence of an event
results in estate tax inclusion if the settlor dies while the estate tax still applies
and the interest has not arisen.42 Even if estate tax inclusion does not occur in
that context, inclusion still would occur if such an interest subjected the assets
of the trust to the claims of the settlor's creditors.4'
Missouri has two other statutes that apply to creditors' ability to reach trust
assets that are more detailed than the UTC and cover issues not covered in that
Code. Section 456.610 allows a trustee of a trust that confers power to pay the
debts of a decedent to publish notice similar to the requirement for notice in a
probate proceeding.' Creditors who are owed a debt are barred from collecting
that debt if they have not received payment or initiated collection proceedings
within six months of the date of publication. The provisions of this Section are
significantly narrower than the probate non-claim statute because the trust non-
claim statute bars only the settlor's debts, not judgment claims, trust contest
39. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9140069 (Oct. 4, 1991).
40. I.R.C. § 2044(c) (2000) provides: "[f]or purposes of this chapter and chapter
13, property includable in the gross estate of the decedent under subsection (a) shall be
treated as property passing from the decedent."
41. Federal law currently provides that the federal estate tax will not apply for
decedents dying after December 31, 2009, andbefore January 1,2010. I.R.C. § 2210 (a)-
(b) (2000).
42. Lloyd Leva Plaine, Preliminary Consideration of Gift, Estate and Generation-
skipping Transfer Tax Planning Issues After Enactment ofthe Economic Growth andTax
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, at 25 (June 27, 2001) (seminar outline, on file with
The American College of Trust and Estate Counsel).
43. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
44. Mo. REV. STAT. § 473.360 (2000).
2002]
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actions, or any other type of claim.45 The statute probably does not violate the
right to procedural due process4' because there is no state action beyond the mere
enactment of the statute.47
Another Missouri statute establishes a rather elaborate procedure for the
satisfaction of claims from non-probate property when the assets in the probate
estate are insufficient to cover such claims.48 If an asset not subject to probate
administration is subject to the satisfaction of a decedent's debts immediately
prior to death it can be brought back into the probate estate to satisfy claims
identified in the statute.49 This is accomplished by a separate action filed against
the person holding title to the non-probate property.5" This statute clearly applies
to assets in revocable trusts."' A probate estate can be opened where the only
asset is the right to reach assets under this statute. 2 The action has to be filed
45. MISSOURI BAR PROBATE & TRUST COMMITTEE, supra note 24, § 456.590 cmt.
46. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
47. Tulsa Prof'l Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 484 (1988).
Whether actual notice was due the claimant in Pope turned on whether the probate claim
bar statute was a self-executing statute of limitations. According to the Court:
The State's interest in a self-executing statute of limitations is in providing
repose for potential defendants and in avoiding stale claims. The State has no
role to play beyond enactment of the limitations period. While this enactment
obviously is state action, the State's limited involvement in the running of the
time period generally falls short of constituting the type of state action
required to implicate the protections of the due process clause.
Id. at 486-87. The Court concluded that the extensive involvement of the court in a
probate non-claim statute constituted state action and invoked due process protection.
Id. Missouri's trust non-claim statute, Missouri Revised Statutes Section 456.610,
certainty does not involve the court at all and, thus, should constitute a self-executing
statute of limitations, as defined in Pope, which does not invoke procedural due process
protection. See JOHN A. BORRON, JR., PROBATE LAWAND PRACTICE, MISSOURI PRACTICE
SB § 909 (3d ed. 2001).
48. Mo. REV. STAT. § 461.300 (2000). This statute is based on Section 6-107 of
the Uniform Probate Code. MISSOURI BAR PROBATE & TRUST COMMITTEE, MISSOURI
PROBATE AND TRUST UPDATE-1989, § 461.071 cmt. (Leo E. Eickhoff, Jr., ed., 1989).
It was originally enacted as part of the Nonprobate Transfers Law in 1989 as Section
461.071. Id. In 1995, it was amended and moved out ofthe Nonprobate Transfers Law.
MISSOURI BAR PROBATE & TRUST COMMITTEE, NONPROBATE TRANSFER LAWS
COMMENTS TO 1995 AMENDMENTS § 461.300 cmt. (unpublished manuscript, on file with
Missouri Bar Probate and Trust Committee).
49. Mo. REV. STAT. § 461.300.1 (2000).
50. Mo. REv. STAT. § 461.300.1 (2000).
51. Mo. REv. STAT. § 461.300.8 (2000); Fischer v. Fischer, 901 S.W.2d 239, 240
(Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
52. Fischer, 901 S.W.2d at 240.
[Vol. 67
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within eighteen months of the decedent's death. 3 The action, however, is
completely derivative of a valid claim filed in the probate action. If a probate
estate is not timely opened or a claim validly filed, then non-probate assets
cannot be reached. 4
III. MOVING TOWARD A MISSOURI TRUST CODE
Adoption of the UTC in Missouri would provide clear rules in the absence
of controlling statutes or case law in such areas as representation principles that
apply outside of court proceedings,"5 rules governing revocable trusts
(particularly statutes of limitations for contesting the validity of revocable
trusts), 6 non-judicial settlement agreements,' and the power to change the situs
of trust administration. 8 The UTC also would provide preferred alternatives to
present Missouri statutes that are problematic, such as rules governing the
53. Mo. REv. STAT. § 461.300.2 (2000).
54. Mo. REv. STAT. § 461.300.1 (2000).
55. UTC art. III. A present Missouri statute, Mo. REV. STAT. § 472.300(2) (2000),
establishes representation rules in trust litigation cases, while UTC Article 3 establishes
elaborate representation rules applicable both in judicial and non-judicial contexts.
56. UTC art. VI. These rules have no parallel in either Missouri statutes or case
law.
57. UTC § 111. While it may be possible under present Missouri law to enter into
an agreement regarding trust matters without court approval or intervention, such
agreements are not expressly authorized. This type of agreement is rarely entered into
because there are invariably minor, unborn, or unascertainable beneficiaries who cannot
be bound by such an agreement. Additionally, such an agreement may be in and of itself
a breach of the trustee's fiduciary duty to follow and defend the trust instrument.
Murphey v. Dalton, 314 S.W.2d 726, 730 (Mo. 1958). Thus, the agreement must meet
the high standard for waiver of such a breach. Scullin v. Clark, 242 S.W.2d 542, 548
(Mo. 1951).
58. UTC § 108(c).
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vacancy of trustees, 9 the statute of limitations for breach of trust actions,' and
tax savings provisions." '
One of the areas where Missouri is likely to depart from the provision of the
UTC is in its approach to the judicial termination and modification of trusts.
Unlike Missouri's modification statute, the UTC closely adheres to the Claflin
rule.6' However, the severe restrictions that the Claflin rule places on trust
termination and modifications are somewhat mitigated.63 Modification upon
consent of all beneficiaries is allowed if "not inconsistent" with a material
purpose of the trust." Modification and/or termination are also specifically
allowed for change of circumstance,65 uneconomical trusts,6" tax reasons,6 7 and
mistakes of fact or law.68
59. Missouri Revised Statutes Sections 456.180-.210 provide a contradictory and
incomplete set of rules for filling trustee vacancies. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 456.180-.210
(2000 & Supp. 2001). While there is a non-judicial procedure for resignation and
appointment, the procedure in Section 456.185 does not apply to declinations to act as
a trustee, and there is no provision for appointment ifthe beneficiaries entitled to income
are all minors.
60. Missouri Revised Statutes Section 456.220 provides for a five-year statute of
limitations from the receipt of a final accounting on trust termination, or a twenty-two-
year limitations period after the termination of the trust if there is no final accounting.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 456.220 (2000).
61. UTC Section 814 allows a co-trustee to exercise a broad discretionary power
of distribution to himself or herself in accordance with an ascertainable standard, instead
of prohibiting the exercise of a power of distribution that is not limited to an
ascertainable standard. Additionally, UTC Section 814(a) provides that a discretionary
power that is absolute, sole, or uncontrolled still can be reviewed by a court for good
faith exercise in conformance with the trust document. There is not a similar provision
in current Missouri law.
62. UTC § 411 cmt.
63. Interestingly enough, a spendthrift clause, which is often the prime motivation
for establishment of trusts and, thus, a very important indicator of a trust's material
purpose, is held by the UTC not presumptively to create a material purpose. UTC §
411 (c); see Wiedenbeck, supra note 9, at 810.
64. UTC § 411(b).
65. UTC § 412.
66. UTC Section 414 creates a new exception for termination of small and
uneconomical trusts unknown at common law, although such provisions are often drafted
into trust documents.
67. UTC Section 416 also creates a new basis for modification of trusts, although
such modifications presently can be made under Missouri Revised Statutes Section
456.590.2.
68. UTC § 415.
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Missouri statutorily rejected the Claflin doctrine by its 1983 adoption of
Section 456.590.2.69 That adoption was based on the lack of flexibility thought
to be inherent in the application of that doctrine, at least in Missouri in such
cases as Thomson v. Union National Bank in Kansas City,70 the first Missouri
case openly to adopt the Claflin rule.7' In that case, the court refused to allow
a trust to be modified by removing a requirement of investment only in certain
specified types of bonds, even though the yield on such bonds had fallen to half
of that paid when the will that created the trust became irrevocable.72 The court
found:
Mr. Thomson [the settlor] not only had in mind the production of
income for his wife for life but, evidently, one of his dominant
concerns was safety of investment and certainty of income. For the
first twenty-five years or more the specified investments have
accomplished all the testator's primary purposes even in the face of
inflation and changing notions as to the safety and desirability of other
types of investments. The testator's primary purposes have not been
defeated or so substantially impaired by changed economic conditions
that the trustee should no longer be required to strictly conform to the
directions of the trust and the settlor's explicit desires.73
It is interesting to contemplate whether a court, today, would find the
modification requesting removal of the investment limitation in Thomson to be
"not inconsistent with" the material purpose of the trust ifUTC Section 411 were
the law of Missouri. The comments to UTC Section 411 state that the finding
of a material purpose "'generally requires some showing of a particular concern
or objective on the part of the settlor, such as concern with regard to the
beneficiary's management skillsjudgment, or level ofmaturity."'' a Section,412,
69. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
70. 291 S.W.2d 178 (Mo. 1956).
71. Id. at 185.
72. Id. (citations omitted).
73. Id. at 184.
74. UTC § 411 cmt. (quoting the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65 cmt. d
(Tentative Draft No. 3, 2001)). The entire comment reads:
Material purposes are not readily to be inferred. A finding of such a purpose
generally requires some showing of a particular concern or objective on the
part of the settlor, such as concern with regard to the beneficiary's
management skills, judgment, or level of maturity. Thus, a court may look
for some circumstantial or other evidence indicating thatthetrust arrangement
represented to the settlor more than a method of allocating the benefits of
property among multiple beneficiaries, or a means of offering to the
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perhaps, could change the result of Thomson, but that Section requires that the
modification for changed circumstances be in furtherance of the trust purposes.
Would removing the investment restrictions further the clear purpose of the
settlor in protecting the value of the trust assets? It is not certain that a modem
court would reach a conclusion different than that of the Thomson court where
an explicit restriction to invest only in bonds was found to constitute a material
purpose expressed by the settlor for the "safety of investment and certainty of
income." '
The return of a material purpose analysis to Missouri law could result in the
return of the inflexibility associated with the Claflin rule, as expressed in Thomas
and other cases.76 In 1983, Missouri made a conscious choice to allow the
beneficiaries to modify trusts by consent so long as the interest of beneficiaries
that could not directly represent themselves was benefitted." There has not been
a groundswell of opposition to the statute or any suggestion that the Claflin rule
should be restored.78 While Section 456.590.2 has been widely used, it has
produced only two reported cases in eighteen years.79
Experience with the statute has raised several practical concerns. First,
Section 456.590.2 is silent as to the role of the trustee in an action brought under
the statute. The trustee is a necessary, if not indispensable, party to any action
involving a trust and, thus, must be joined in any action under Section
456.590.2. By its terms, however, the statute does not require or even allow
consideration of the trustee's view on the decision to vary the trust terms or
terminate the trust. Because trusts often involve family members, the trustee
may be the only impartial party in the action to raise the issue whether the
variation or termination really benefits the minor, unborn, or unascertained
beneficiaries (but not imposing on them) a particular advantage. Sometimes,
of course, the very nature or design of a trust suggests its protective nature or
some other material purpose.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65 cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2001).
75. Thomson, 291 S.W.2d at 183.
76. See First Nat'l Bank of Kan. City v. Christopher, 624 S.W.2d 474, 479-81 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1981).
77. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
78. See Wiendenbeck, supra note 9, at 824. In that article, Professor Wiendenbeck
urged an expansive reading of the then-new Section 456.590 that did not rely upon an
analysis of the settlor's intent. Wiendenbeck, supra note 9, at 824.
79. In re Trust of Nitsche, 46 S.W.3d 682, 685-86 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001);
Hamerstrom v. Commerce Bank of Kan. City, N.A., 808 S.W.2d 434,436-39 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1991).
80. Clifford S. Brown & Douglas D. Lee, Trust Contests in I MISSOuRI TRUSTS,
POWERS OF ATTORNEY, CUSTODIANSHIPS, AND NONPROBATE MATrERS, TRUST AND
ESTATE SERIES §§ 6.20, 6.24 (MoBarCLE 1998).
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beneficiaries of the trust. While it is unlikely that a Section 456.590.2 action will
be taken without joining the trustee, the lack of mention in the statute may lead
some to conclude that the trustee's input into the variation or termination is not
germane.
The real concern with actions brought under Section 456.590.2 is whether
there is a true analysis of the benefit of the variation or termination to the minor,
unborn, or unascertained beneficiaries. The consent of all adult beneficiaries is
the only true statutory requirement. Faced with this consent, a judge, perhaps
with little familiarity with the law of trusts, may view the matter as similar to the
entry of a consent judgement. Thus, the parties' contention that some benefit
will accrue to the minor, unborn, or unascertained beneficiaries by reason of the
termination or variation may receive little independent analysis. Arguments by
counsel for the parties advocating a variation or termination often rely on the fact
that the minor, unborn, and unascertained beneficiaries are deemed represented
under the present representation rules by adult beneficiaries who have consented
to the proposed modification or termination. t
However, truebenefitto the minor, unborn, and unascertainedbeneficiaries
from a Section 456.590.2 action, especially if the trust is being terminated, is
probably rare82 by the very nature of the situation.' Those classes of
beneficiaries who are either unrepresented or deemed represented by others will
almost invariably be the remainder beneficiaries whose interests, in fact, will be
extinguished by the termination. Perhaps, the problem is that the appointment
of a GAL to represent the minor, unborn, and unascertained beneficiaries is the
exception rather than the rule. It is probably not a coincidence that in the only
two known cases involving a Section 456.590.2 termination to be appealed had
an appointed GAL as a party."
Thus, if the principles of present Section 456.590.2 are incorporated into
Missouri's version of the UTC, serious consideration should be made to
increasing the protection accorded the interests of the minor, unborn, and
unascertained beneficiaries. Instead ofrequiring that the variation or termination
"benefit"' the minor, unborn, and unascertainedbeneficiaries, perhaps the court
should be required to find that the interests of those beneficiaries are adequately
protected by any proposed variation or termination.86 This would give parties to
a Section 456.590.2 action and the court more flexibility in crafting remedies
81. Mo. REV. STAT. § 472.300 (2000). This argument will become stronger if the
UTC's more complete set of representation rules is enacted.
82. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
83. See Davis & Sturdevant, supra note 22, § 25.12.
84. Nitsche, 46 S.W.3d at 682; Hamerstrom, 808 S.W.2d at 434.
85. Mo. REV. STAT. § 456.590.2 (2000).
86. UTC Section 411 (e)(2) presently uses this standard where the court terminates
or modifies a trust and not all beneficiaries consent.
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instead of applying a rigid yes-or-no solution to terminations or modifications. 7
For example, a court could refuse to terminate a trust but, rather, could commute
the life beneficiary's interest with the trust continuing for the benefit of the
minor, unborn, and unascertained beneficiaries. Protection of those classes of
beneficiaries also could be enhanced by requirements that beneficiaries
benefitting from the termination have to leave testamentary dispositions in favor
of classes of beneficiaries that did not benefit from the termination.88
Another measure to improve the protection of minor, unborn, and
unascertained beneficiaries would be to require the appointment of a GAL89
upon the request of a party, unless the court finds good cause not to do so. Of
course, a court always should have authority to appoint a GAL on its own
motion. The appointment of a GAL would be presumed,. unless the court
specifically held there was not a reason for one to be appointed. Easier
appointment of a GAL, coupled with a requirement that the court protect the
interests of minor, unborn, and unascertained beneficiaries, could result in
greater protection for these classes of beneficiaries. 90
If Missouri's present approach to trust modification and termination by
consent is incorporated into its version of the UTC, the impact of that approach
on other provisions of the UTC must be analyzed. The UTC provides for non-
judicial settlement agreements that can accomplish anything a court can
accomplish so long as the agreement does not violate a material purpose of the
trust.91 Thus, such agreement can include termination or modifications. If the
more liberal rules of Section 456.590.2 are incorporated into Missouri's version
of UTC Section 411 (b), the propriety of allowing a non-judicial agreement to
terminate a trust must be questioned. Such agreements should be prohibited
from terminating a trust pursuant to the more liberal standards.
87. Some courts already perceive that they possess the power to craft creative
requirements for protecting the interests of minor, unborn, and unascertained
beneficiaries in Section 456.590.2 actions. Davis & Sturdevant, supra note 22, § 25.12.
The English Variation of Trusts Act seems to allow the creation of protective
arrangements when terminating trusts. See Wiedenbeck, supra note 9, at 818.
88. See Davis & Sturdevant, supra note 22, § 25.12.
89. Section 305 of the UTC allows a court to appoint a representative to represent
an unrepresented interest or an interest that the court deems is not adequately represented.
This Section could be used for this purpose if the UTC were adopted in Missouri.
90. Swift, supra note 13, § 5.6.
91. UTC Section 111 provides that: "[a] non-judicial settlement agreement is valid
only to the extent it does not violate a material purpose of the trust and includes terms
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UTC Article 5 governs the validity of spendthrift clauses and governs
creditor claims against rust.L92 Section 502 provides that "[a] spendthrift
provision is valid only if it restrains both the voluntary and involuntary transfer
ofabeneficiary's interest." 3 This is contrary to present Missouri law that allows
a valid spendthrift provision to restrain either type of transfer. 4 The UTC
provides that a settlor should not be able to allow a beneficiary freely to make
assignments for the benefit of creditors while keeping the creditor from attaching
trust assets.9" Missouri has made the opposite choice, although few settlors take
advantage of the flexibility. There does not seem to be a compelling reason to
limit the freedom of the settlor in controlling the beneficial enjoyment of
property. This might be a different situation if the settlor freely could protect his
or her assets from the creditor by the use of a spendthrift clause.
Under the provisions of the UTC, a settlor cannot protect assets from
creditors by the use of a spendthrift provision in a trust.96 All assets of revocable
trusts97 are subject to the claims of the settlor.9" The creditors of a settlor of an
irrevocable trust can reach "the maximum amount that can be distributed to or
for the settlor's benefit."9 This stance is not in accord wvith Missouri's present
limited exception to that rule. 100 Missouri's limited exception is designed to
allow retention by a settlor of a discretionary interest as one of a class of
beneficiaries. This exception should allow estate-planning techniques that would
require a settlor to retain some interest in a trust that should not be included in
the settlor's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes.' This seems to be a
valid purpose that, when weighed against the narrowness of the exception, tends
to lean toward maintaining the exception in a Missouri version of the UTC.
Present Missouri legal precepts may control the satisfaction of a settlor's
debts from trust assets after death even if the UTC is adopted. The UTC
provides that assets of a trust revocable immediately prior to the settlor's death
are subject to the claims of the settlor's creditors. 2 Administration costs of the
92. UTC art. VI.
93. UTC § 502(a).
94. Mo. RaV. STAT. § 456.080.2 (2000).
95. UTC § 502(a) cmt.
96. UTC § 505.
97. The term "revocable" is defined in UTC Section 103(13) as revocable by the
settlor without the consent of the trustee or a person holding an adverse interest.
98. UTC § 505(a)(1).
99. UTC § 505(a)(2).
100. Missouri Revised Statutes Section 456.080.3 provides a limited exception to
a settlor's ability to shield assets from creditors by use of a spendthrift clause. Mo. REV.
STAT. § 456.080.3 (2000); see supra notes 32-42 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
102. UTC § 505(a)(3).
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settlor's estate, expenses of settlor's funeral and disposal of remains, and
statutory allowances to spouses and minor children are also payable from the
assets of a revocable trust.13 These claims and other expenses, however, are
only recoverable "to the extent the settlor's probate estate is inadequate to satisfy
those claims, costs, expenses, and [allowances]."" 4 This Section of the UTC
raises many issues. Ifthe trust is not revocable, but the settlor's debts could have
been satisfied from that trust prior to the settlor's death, should those assets not
be reachable by the settlor's creditors? Who has the right to recover trust
assets-the creditor or the deceased settlor's personal representative? Is there
a time limit on such recovery? Does the running of the claim period in the
settlor's probate estate prevent a claim to be brought under this statute?
Fortunately, all of these questions are answered by Missouri statutes,' and a
reference to Section 461.300 should be inserted in this Section in lieu of the
UTC language if the UTC is adopted.
However, an issue that exists in this area of Missouri law should be
addressed. Missouri has a statute that allows a trustee that has the duty or power
to pay a deceased settlor's debts to publish notice to creditors similar to
publishing notice to creditors of a probate estate. 06 Section 461.300 provides
that creditors can reach assets of revocable trusts through a proceeding
authorized by that Section within eighteen months of the settlor's death,
assuming a claim has been perfected in the settlor's probate proceedings. Both
purport to cut off creditors, yet each has different procedures and claim periods.
If the trust non-claim period has run after notice is published under Section
456.610, it is not clear whether a valid probate claim can be satisfied from trust
assets through the procedure set forth in Section 461.300.107 Assuming that the
notice procedure of Section 456.610 passes constitutional muster, 08 it should
either control, preventing a Section 456.300 action from being brought if the
notice period has run, or it is meaningless and should be repealed.
Missouri trustees have relied upon the efficacy of this procedure since 1983,
and it has facilitated the distribution of trusts. 9 Eighteen months is a long time
for distributions to be delayed while the trustee awaits the expiration of all
claims against the decedent. The concept of publication of notice and a claim
103. UTC § 505(a)(3).
104. UTC § 505(a)(3).
105. See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
107. See JOHN A. BORRON, JR., PROBATE LAW AND PRACTICE, 5 MissoURI
PRACTICE § 15 (1999).
108. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
109. See BORRON, supra note 107, § 15.
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bar period should be retained in a Missouri version of the UTC"0 and should
control the barring of claims against trustees of certain trusts. The language of
the two statutes ' ' should be harmonized so that they apply to the same class of
claims. Trusts against which claims are barred by publication of notice should
be changed". to trusts, the property of which are "subject to the satisfaction of
the decedent's debts immediately prior to the decedent's death.""'
IV. CONCLUSION
Adoption of the UTC in Missouri clearly will provide a lot of guidance in
an area that is notoriously thin on controlling authority. There are, however,
some areas of Missouri trust law that are well developed and unique to this
jurisdiction. A judicious blending of current Missouri law and the UTC likely
will provide a sound body of trust statutes as the next millennium commences.
110. These existing Missouri provisions probably will be inserted into UTC
Section 505(3).
111. MO. REv. STAT. §§ 456.610,461.300 (2000 & Supp. 2001).
112. That class is presently a trust from which "[a]ny trustee has a duty or power
to pay the debts of a decedent" to a trust. Mo. REV. STAT. § 456.610 (2000).
113. MO.REv. STAT. § 461.300.8 (2000).
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